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The Long Road Towards
Restoration of Religious Freedom:
Congressional Options in Light of
City ofBoerne v. Flores
BY J. JEFFREY PATTERSON*
In Washington, D.C., a battle has been raging between the U.S.
Congress and the Supreme Court over the scope of our religious freedoms.
The Supreme Court fired the first shot in 1990 with its decision in
Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith,' holding
that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt religious believers from
compliance with generally applicable laws that are inconsistent with their
beliefs.2 In 1993, Congress struck back with the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 3 which mandated that federal and state courts
apply the strictest level of scrutiny whenever government action substan-
tially burdens religious practice. In June of 1997, the Supreme Court
retaliated with the case of City of Boerne v. Flores,4 which not only
reaffirmed Smith but also struck down RFRA as an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power.
Congress has reacted quickly to the Supreme Court's decision in
Flores. The Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings in October 1997
to determine how Congress might react to the Court's decision.5 Judiciary
Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch declared, "The City ofBoerne decision
J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky.
'Employment Div., Dep't offHuman Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 See id. at 878-79.
3Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(1994).
4 City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
5 See Congress' Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 105th Cong. (1997)
[hereinafter Hearing].
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was, to say the least, a deep disappointment to us in Congress, and to all
Americans who care about religious liberty."6
Numerous law scholars testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee
about the possibilities for "appropriate Federal legislation"7 in response to
the voiding of RFRA. The intent of Congress to restrict its action to the
legislative level was clear, and Senator Richard Durbin admitted, "I have
to say that I am very loathe to turn to a constitutional amendment to solve
our ills. It unfortunately has become a fashionable thing on Capitol Hill and
we now have an avalanche of constitutional amendments."8 However,
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen warned the Committee, "In my view, the
best way to restore the protections of RFRA is by a constitutional
amendment.... It is, in my view, the only absolutely certain way to reenact
the substance of RFRA."9
This Note concentrates on the various problems Congress will face in
attempting to revive the substance of RFRA. Part I contains a brief
summary of RFRA itself, the circumstances that led to its enactment, and
the reaction to the new statute.' Part II summarizes the Court's opinion in
the recently decided Flores case and briefly examines the public reaction
to the decision." This Note then considers in Part III the propriety and
potential effectiveness of reviving the protections of RFRA through
legislative action.' 2 Finally, Part IV proposes that an amendment to the
Constitution reenacting RFRA would be an appropriate and effective
manner of protecting the American people from state intrusion into their
religious practices.13
I. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 4 became one of the most
popular bills to pass through Washington in recent memory. 5 Conse-
6 Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Committee Chairman).
7Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Committee Chairman).8 Id. at 42 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
9Id. at 15 (prepared statement of Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen).
'oSee discussion infra Part I.
"See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
14 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(1994).
15 See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al8.
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quently, it sped through Congress without a single objection in the House
and was approved by a vote of ninety-seven to three in the Senate. 6 The
ACLU and the Southern Baptist Convention, strange bedfellows indeed,
were among the coalitions that lined up to support RFRA. "7 When President
Clinton signed the Act, he commented on the incredibly broad base of
support it generated by declaring, "'The power of God is such that even in
the legislative process miracles can happen.""'
RFRA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's 1990 decision
in Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith. I9 Smith
involved the case of two substance abuse counselors who had been fired for
ingesting peyote in a sacramental Native American ceremony, ° the use of
which was banned by Oregon law.2 They were denied unemployment
compensation because of another state law which disallows unemployment
benefits to those discharged for work-related "misconduct."' The
respondents claimed that the Court's decisions in Sherbert v. Verner' and
Wisconsin v. Yoder24 made clear that government action must be justified
by a "compelling state interest"' to result in a "substantial infringement" '26
of an individual's free exercise of religion.27 The Smith Court, in a majority
opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the religious exemptions doctrine was
inapplicable to "an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular
16 See id.
7 See id.
18 Id.
9 EmploymentDiv., Dep'tofHuman Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872(1990).20 See id. at 874.
21 Under Oregon law, possession of peyote, a Schedule 1 controlled substance,
constituted a Class B felony. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987) (amended
1991); OR. ADMIN. R. 885-80-021(3)(s) (1988). After the decision in Smith,
however, the Oregon legislature amended their drug laws to provide an exemption
for the religious use of peyote. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5)(a)-(b) (1997).
22 OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a).
' Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state could not deny
unemployment benefits to an individual who was fired for refusing to work on
Saturday for religious reasons).
" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating a mandatory school
attendance law as applied to Amish parents who refused for religious reasons to
send their children to school).
2 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
26 Id.
27 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
form of conduct,"28 and that Oregon did not need to provide a compelling
justification for the burden it placed on the Native American church.29 In
so doing, the Court declined to apply the balancing test it first developed
in Sherbert, and while Smith did not overrule Sherbert or Yoder, the
decision essentially limited the holdings of those two cases to their facts.
Congress was clearly taking on the Smith decision through its
enactment of RFRA. Congress did not even attempt to veil its intent to
directly overrule the case, as the short list of findings included the
following:
(4) [I]n Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests. 0
RFRA's purposes were:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened by government 3l
RFRA's strict scrutiny test provided that any substantial government
burden on religious practices would only be justified if the imposition of
the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" 2 and
"is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
28 Id. at 884.
29 See id. at 885 ("To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State's interest is 'compelling' . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense.").
30Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994).
311d. § 2000bb(b).21d. § 2000bb-l(b)(1).
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interest.''33 As opposed to the law of Smith, which allowed substantial
burdening of religious practices so long as the law was neutral and
generally applicable, 34 RFRA set an exacting standard for governments to
meet to prove they have not violated the Free Exercise Clause.
RFRA also guaranteed that its effects would be felt at every level of
government. Congress defined "government" to mean "a branch, depart-
ment, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under
color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State."3
The coverage was expanded even further: "This chapter applies to all
Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether
statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16,
1993."" RFRA's "sweeping coverage 37 sent a congressional mandate to
employees at every level of government, ordering them to keep a close eye
on how their actions impacted religious practices. 8
As opposed to public reaction to the new law, scholarly review tended
to be negative. Well before the issue reached the Supreme Court, numerous
legal scholars proposed that Congress lacked the power to enact RFRA and
threw its constitutionality into question.39
Treatment of RFRA in the federal courts centered mostly on the
applications ofRFRA and not the constitutional validity of the Act. A large
proportion of the cases filed under RFRA were brought by prisoners.4 The
courts, for the most part, tended to hold that maintaining order and security
33 Id. § 2000bb-l(b)
34 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 79-82.
35 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1).
36 Id. § 2000bb-3(a).
37City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1997).
3See id. at 2170.
3 See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Con-
stitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39
(1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom RestorationActIs Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U.L.REV. 437 (1994); Marci
A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZo
L. REv. 357 (1994); William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE
L.J. 291 (1996). But see Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883 (1994); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (1997) (predicting
that the Supreme Court would uphold RFRA by a vote of at least seven to two).
4 See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 358 n.3.
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in the prison constituted a compelling state interest under the statute and
thus denied relief to the inmates.4' The requirement of a compelling state
interest also produced challenges to many other types of state action,
including loyalty oaths,42 takings of land, 43 and zoning laws." The
constitutionality of RFRA was an issue that many courts neglected to take
into serious consideration. The United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii confronted the issue, but showed a great deal of deference to
Congress in holding that Supreme Court precedent supported allowing
Congress to limit the Court's constitutional doctrine in order to expand a
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.s The issue of whether or
not RFRA was truly constitutional did not capture the nation's attention,
however, until a little church in west Texas decided to appeal a zoning
decision all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States.46
41 See Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (finding that a
prison haircut policy furthers compelling state interests including security, easy
identification, cleanliness, and prevention of escape); Best v. Kelly, 879 F. Supp.
305 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a compelling state interest in prison security
justifies denial of a disruptive inmate's right to attend religious services); Diaz v.
Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (upholding the denial of an inmate's
access to religious objects, including a shell, sacred stones, pipes, and drums,
because prison security is a compelling state interest and because religious practice
was not substantially burdened), affid, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997). But see
Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995) (deciding that a denial of an
inmate's right to follow religious practice requiring Kosher diet, long hair,
headdress, and a vow of poverty must be struck down under RFRA as it is
unrelated to any compelling state interest, including security).42 SeeBessardv. California Community Colleges, 867 F. Supp. 1454 (E.D. Cal.
1994) (holding that requiring employees to take loyalty oaths to the state is not the
least restrictive means of promoting a state interest where the employee is a
Jehovah's Witness and may swear no allegiance to any entity other than God).
43 See Thiry v. Carlson, 887 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that a
couple did not prove the substantial burden necessary to state a claim under RFRA
where the state sought to take land upon which their stillborn child was buried),
affd, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 78 (1996).
44 See Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F.
Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that a church was entitled to a preliminary
injunction allowing it to continue feeding the homeless in violation of zoning
ordinances because the law interfered with an important social welfare and
religious program).45 See Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. Haw. 1995).
46 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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II. CITY OFBOERNE V. FLORES AND THE DEATH OF RFRA
City of Boerne v. Flores47 proved to be one of the most volatile
decisions of the Supreme Court's 1997 term. Unlike many controversial
decisions of the Rehnquist Court, however, a majority of the Court
subscribed to one opinion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for
the majority, joined in its entirety by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Stevens, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg.48 Justice Scalia also joined
the majority opinion except for one section outlining the legislative history
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 9 Concurring opinions were written by
Justice Stevens 0 and by Justice Scalia, joined by Stevens."
The case arose when a church in the town ofBoeme, Texas, applied for
a building permit to enlarge its structure. 2 The church building as it existed
was too small to accommodate all of the people who wished to worship
there.53 The zoning authorities denied the permit, citing an ordinance
governing historic preservation. 4 The Archbishop of the Diocese brought
suit under RFRA seeking to invalidate the ordinance on the grounds that
the town could not advance a compelling justification for denying the
permit.5 The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
declared RFRA unconstitutional in ruling for the town,56 but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 7
The majority's main holding in Flores was that RFRA exceeded the
power of Congress under the Constitution and was thus void.58 The holding
established that Congress has no substantive, plenary powers under the
"7 City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
48 See id. at 2159.
49 See id.
51 See id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"' See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).52 See id. at 2160.
53 See id.
' See id.
51 See id. at 2160-62.
56 See Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd,
73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
51 See Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117
S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
" See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 ("Broad as the power of Congress is under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.").
1998-99]
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Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Under the Court's
view, the police powers belong strictly to the states, and the Enforcement
Clause is limited to the purposes of curing violations of the amendment as
the Court has defined it.6"
Before reaching the enforcement issue, the majority tackled its
controversial holding in Smith, which gave rise to RFRA in the first place.
The Court gave a brief recitation of the facts and background of Smith
before reaffirming its holding that "neutral, generally applicable laws may
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling
governmental interest."61
Having established that the Smith rationale was still the yardstick for
the Free Exercise Clause,62 the Court moved on to the question of
congressional power to change that standard.63 Justice Kennedy first cited
McCulloch v. Maryland'A and Marbury v. Madison" as the early Supreme
Court cases that were instrumental to our federalist system of
government.66 The powers of the federal government are enumerated, and
not limitless, under McCulloch,67 and Marbury stands for the principle that
Congress's power does not extend to the ability to determine constitutional-
ity.6 8
After laying the foundation for his opinion, Justice Kennedy addressed
whether Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power
"in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions,
those which impose its requirements on the States."69 Conceding that the
Free Exercise Clause is indeed within the scope of the congressional
enforcement power,70 the Court examined its earlier holdings regarding the
scope of that power. The argument for the respondent was that RFRA
simply protected the free exercise liberty of religious minorities beyond
9 A contrary reading of the Enforcement Clause, section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, could be inferred from Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
60Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163-66.61 Id. at 2161.
62 See id. at 2160-61.
63 See id. at 2162.
' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).61 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6 See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.67 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
68 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
69Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.70 See id. at 2163 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
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what Smith said is necessary.71 The respondent also argued that the
Enforcement Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation beyond what
is merely "remedial '7 2 or "preventive.
73
While Justice Kennedy acknowledged that there have been numerous
occasions when the Court upheld congressional utilization of its enforce-
ment powers against the states, he used many of those same cases to
reiterate the strict limits that the Court placed on those powers.74 He cited
South Carolina v. Katzenbach75 to stress that, contrary to the respondent's
contentions, the enforcement power is indeed "remedial."76 Additionally,
the argument that Congress was merely protecting the free exercise rights
of religious minorities amounted to a logical fallacy to Justice Kennedy,
because "[1]egislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the
power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation." '77
In support of the contention that the enforcement power is remedial,
Justice Kennedy briefly recounted the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, taking particular notice of objections to the original Bingham
draft of the amendment.78 Members of Congress objected to this draft on
the theory that it would give Congress powers tantamount to what the
respondent in Flores was arguing that Congress had.79 The draft that was
71 See id.
72Id.
73Id.
74See id. at 2163-64.
' South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
76Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326, regarding the
Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment).
771d.
7 See id. Representative John Bingham of Ohio proposed the following draft
amendment:
"The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property."
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)). The objections to
this draft centered around the fact that giving Congress this power would usurp
many of the police powers traditionally reserved to the states. See id.
71 See id.
1998-99]
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ultimately ratified was carefully constructed to give Congress powers that
were "no longer plenary but remedial."8
In addition to the legislative history of the amendment, Justice
Kennedy noted that the Supreme Court had sharply limited the enforcement
power as early as the CivilRights Cases,"1 where the Court stressed that the
Enforcement Clause "did not authorize Congress to pass 'general legisla-
tion upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation.' "82
Oregon v. Mitchell,83 in addition to Katzenbach and the Civil Rights
Cases, provided compelling support for voiding RFRA. 4 A majority of a
very fragmented Court in Mitchell concluded that Congress exceeded its
enforcement powers by setting a minimum voting age of eighteen for state
and local elections, because this legislation "intruded into an area reserved
by the Constitution to the States."85 Four of the five justices in the Mitchell
majority directly stated that the Enforcement Clause does not give
Congress the power to interpret the meaning of the Constitution.86
Finally, the Flores majority rejected the alternative argument of the
respondent that RFRA was in fact a remedial measure.87 The Court pointed
out that the legislative record conclusively established that the Act was not
aimed at any instances of deliberate persecution of religious minorities, and
hence, could not possibly be "remedial."88 The record, as Justice Kennedy
pointed out, did not mention any intentional discrimination within the last
forty years.89 When the Court had previously upheld exercises of the
enforcement power, Congress had used the power narrowly. Congress had
aimed its power at specific instances where the states violated citizens'
constitutional rights, in regions where the constitutional violations had been
most serious, and had allowed for termination of the enforcement when
violations ceased. 9 RFRA, on the other hand, had none of these limiting
8Od. at 2165.
81 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
82Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166 (quoting the CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13).
83 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
84 SeeFlores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167-68, 2170.
85 Id. at 2167 (construing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 125, in which Justice Black's
majority opinion indicated that the Framers wanted to limit regulation of state and
local elections to a power reserved for the states).86 See id. at 2167-68 (construing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 209).
87 See id. at 2168-70.
881Id. at 2169.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 2170 (construing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966), which illustrated that the Voting Rights Act is remedial because it impacts
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qualities: "Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost
every description and regardless of subject matter."'
There were three dissents filed in Flores. Justice O'Connor wrote a
lengthy dissent voicing agreement with the Fourteenth Amendment
reasoning of the majority, but making a strong historical argument in favor
of reconsidering the no-exemptions holding of the Smith decision. 92 Justice
Breyer joined the parts of O'Connor's opinion urging reconsideration of
Smith, but wrote separately to stress that the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement issues did not need to be considered at all.93 Justice Souter
wrote a short dissent urging reargument solely on the issue of whether
Smith was good law.94
Another challenge to Smith could be imminent. However, the fact that
the six majority Justices, plus dissenting Justice O'Connor, rebuked
Congress for its abuse of its powers over the states9' indicates that the
controversial federalist tenet of the Court's holding in Flores should be
good law for some time. If Congress is to reenact RFRA in substance, it
will have to be very careful in choosing its means.
Unlike RFRA itself, which enjoyed massive public support in spite of
scholarly criticism, 96 the public reaction to the Court's Flores decision was
overwhelmingly negative. The decision was lambasted as "a devasting
salvo, the most brutal attack on the Capitol since the British burned it in
18 12."9' One commentator wondered "whether political authority in our
democracy still rests with the people"98 and suggestedthat Congress simply
ignore the Court's ruling and announce that it still regards RFRA as good
law.99 Counsel for the National Council of Churches likened Flores to the
only a certain portion of the country, affects a small class of state law, and
terminates upon cessation of discrimination).
91 Id.
92 See id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93 See id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9' See id. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95 See id. at 2157-72, 2176.
96 See supra notes 15-18, 39 and accompanying text.
97 Charles W. Colson, Whose Constitution Is It? The Balance of Power Is Dis-
turbed When the Supreme Court Bars Congress from Amplifying Constitutional
Rights, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1997, at B5.
98 rd.
99 See id.
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Dred Scott decision."° The Southern Baptist Convention's counsel called
it "'the worst religious liberty decision of the last 50 years."""'
Just as RFRA attracted an unusually broad base of public support, the
criticism of Flores comes from all angles of the political spectrum. 0 2 The
American people's overwhelming support of the no-exemptions point of
view highlights the need for Congress to do something in the face of the
Court's recent rebuke of Congress's enactment of RFRA and reiteration of
a pro-exemptions standard."°3 The two most viable options in the late 1990s
appear to be exercise of the spending power to enact RFRA-like legislation
and, probably even better, enactment of a constitutional amendment in
wording identical to that of the recently voided Act.
m. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FEDERAL RFRA-LIKE LEGISLATION
Numerous ways of utilizing the legislative powers of Congress to
somehow reenact the substance of RFRA at the state level were suggested
by the law scholars in attendance at the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing in October 1997. The methods mentioned included the Commerce
Clause,"° the treaty power, 05 the spending power,' and a better-crafted
bill based on the Enforcement Clause, section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 07
It must be noted that none of these powers, for reasons discussed
below, are likely to produce legislation that comes anywhere near to
providing the protections of the original RFRA. There are many Supreme
Court cases in the 1990s which have cut down the extent to which Congress
may use its enumerated powers to regulate the states,' and Flores is just
" See Michael D. Goldhaber, Religious Leaders Fear Implications ofRecent
Court Ruling, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 19, 1997, at 1G (reporting the
popularity of the RFRA and discussing the negative implications of its overruling
in Flores).
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 See id.; Colson, supra note 97, at B5.
10 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'
05 To pass a law implementing the terms of an existing treaty, Congress would
formally act under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
106 Id. art. I, § 8, el. 1.
"1Id, amend. XIV, § 5.
10' See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (invalidating, on state
sovereignty grounds, a portion of the Brady Bill requiring local law enforcement
officers to perform background checks on prospective gun buyers); United States
[VOL. 87
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one example. The power which remains the largest, under current Supreme
Court federalist jurisprudence, is clearly the spending power.
However, the use of any of these powers to reenact RFRA is not likely
to soften relations between Congress and the Court. The Supreme Court
took care to note in its Flores opinion that Congress explicitly evidenced
its intent to overrule Smith, 10 9 and whether or not Congress cites its intent
as unambiguously in a subsequent RFRA, the Court would probably view
the bill as another means to the same end. City ofBoerne v. Flores stands
for nothing if it does not mean that the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution and the Free Exercise Clause is controlling. Codifying the no-
exemptions reading of the Free Exercise Clause is obviously an extremely
important goal of Congress, but a legislative solution should not be resorted
to without serious thought. The most likely effect of a reenactment under
another power would be that the new law would have a short life, as did
RFRA. Another unsavory possibility is that the Court might further restrict
whatever power Congress chooses to invoke in order to comport with the
state-federal boundary set by Flores.
A. The Commerce Power
Legislation based on the congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce was a frequent suggestion at the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing."' However, United States v. Lopez"' significantly diminished
congressional power over the states by means of the Commerce Clause
after sixty years of virtual free reign. There, the Court struck down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act on the premise that possession of guns, even
in the aggregate, is not an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce."1 The Court took pains in Lopez to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial activity."' The likelihood that the
Supreme Court would approve of any bill regulating state conduct
burdening religion is exceedingly slim in light of the Lopez opinion.
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act as not
within the commerce power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(holding that aprovision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act requiring that states take title to radioactive waste under certain conditions
violates state sovereignty).
'o See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2158 (1997).
"o See Hearing, supra note 5.
.. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12 See id. at 567-68.
"I See id. at 566.
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Religious practice is simply not sufficiently "commercial" enough in
character to justify RFRA-like regulations. 14
A look back to the situation that brought rise to the Smith case is
illustrative. The Smith respondents lost their unemployment benefits
because of their religious use of peyote. Even though the unemployment
compensation of the two respondents was at issue" 5 and financial support
is certainly an "activity [that] substantially affects interstate commerce,"' 16
the Smith opinion focused on the issue of the burden on religion caused by
banning peyote use." 7 The Lopez court viewed the issue extremely
narrowly,"' looking at gun possession and not the broader issue of
education. It is thus very difficult to believe that a court reviewing a Smith-
like situation would expand the issue from peyote use to unemployment
benefits in order to avoid striking down a commerce-based RFRA statute.
Peyote use is a noncommercial activity in much the same way that gun
possession is. It would probably be impossible to substantively achieve
anything near the broad protections of RFRA through a statute based on the
Commerce Clause, assuming a court reviewing the statute were to apply a
"substantial effects" test.
Professor Daniel Conkle agrees that Commerce Clause legislation
would be inappropriate. He told the Senate Judiciary Committee:
[T]o focus on the potentially economic character of some religious
conduct might be to miss the point.... And even if Lopez permitted a
RFRA-Iike law to be applied upon a showing that particular government
burdens on religion actually had a significant economic impact, this
would leave the congressional legislation invalid or inappropriate in many
or most of the situations that RFRA itself was designed to address."19
"
4 See id. at 565-66.
"
5 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
874-75 (1990).
116 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.").
17 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 875-76.
"' The Court asked whether possession of a gun in a school zone is an activity
that "arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, asked the considerably broader question, whether
"Congress rationally [could] have found that 'violent crime in school zones,'
through its effect on the 'quality of education,' significantly (or substantially)
affects 'interstate' or 'foreign commerce."' Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"' Hearing, supra note 5, at 32-33 (prepared statement of Prof. Daniel Conkle).
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If Congress really desires to use its powers to institute a lasting, compre-
hensive, pro-exemptions standard that state and local governments must
follow, then it must pay attention to Conkle's warnings about the propriety
of using the Commerce Clause to achieve that end.
Not everyone is quite as skeptical about the likelihood of success for
a Commerce Clause-basedbill. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky believes that
the Supreme Court would uphold a law if Congress could document in the
record that the free exercise of religion has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.120 Professor Douglas Laycock, who argued Flores for the City,
concedes that an exercise of the commerce power might not provide quite
the scope of the protections of RFRA, but he argues, "[M]any religious
practices do affect commercial transactions.... Unless we see dramatic
changes in Commerce Clause doctrine, Congress can protect many
religious practices under the Commerce Clause."'2 The testimony of these
scholars indicates that while Lopez has probably ended the heyday of
unlimited congressional commerce power over the states, the proposition
that a more limited, RFRA-like bill based on the Commerce Clause would
be struck down by the Court is not universally accepted. 2 2
B. The Treaty Power
An even less likely option is Gerald Neuman's proposal that Congress
use the treaty power to reenact RFRA.12 He argues that this power "would
support a verbatim re-enactment"' 24 of RFRA based on Article 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("CCPR").125 Many
scholars write this option off rather quickly because the current, conserva-
tive Congress would certainly be loath to rely on international law to assert
its power over the states,'26 but the argument is worth mentioning.
Congressional power in this area is again subject to some doubt'27 in light
'
2I See id. at 27 (statement of Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky).
.. Id. at 8-9 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
'"See discussion supra Part III.A and sources cited supra notes 110-14.
' See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 33 (1997).
124 Id. at 53.
12 See id.
126 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 34 (prepared statement of Prof. Daniel
Conkle).
127 See id. (prepared statement of Prof. Daniel Conkle).
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of a potential state sovereignty objection based on Missouri v. Holland.28
An act of Congress enabling a treaty is subject to the limitations of
Congress's power;" 9 the fact that there is a treaty to which the United
States is a party does not empower Congress to take police powers. 3 '
The words of the CCPR would easily support a watered-down RFRA
substituting a form of intermediate scrutiny in place of the stringent strict
scrutiny standard of the original bill.'3' Article 18, unlike the vague text and
legislative history of the Free Exercise Clause, indicates that exemption
from neutral, generally applicable laws is protected, unless the limitation
is "'necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."" 32 However, the words of the
CCPR fail to even approach the compelling interest and least restrictive
means tests of the original.RFRA. In light of the congressional aversion to
the treaty power and the weaker standard set by CCPR, the likelihood of a
new RFRA based on Congress's ability to enact legislation to implement
the treaty is minute.
C. The Enforcement Power
Professor Douglas Laycock supports the concept of another RFRA-like
bill based on the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment.' He
concedes that a literal reenactment would never pass the Court's scrutiny
no matter how good a record Congress compiled to support the idea that the
bill was a remedial measure.3 4 Laycock stresses, however, that Flores
"does not deprive Congress of all power to protect religious exercise under
its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment" and believes that the
Flores opinion evidences that "the Court means to require a more detailed
factual record than Congress compiled for RFRA."'135 He calls for a new
RFRA that would be clearly targeted towards violations of Smith, with
findings specifying that Congress seeks to deter such unconstitutional
s Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
129 See id. at 433.
13 0 See id. at 432.
131 See Neuman, supra note 123, at 45-46.
13 2 Id. at 44 (quoting CCPR Art. 18(3)).
133 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 9-12 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas
Laycock).
134 See id. at 9 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
135 Id. (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
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conduct.'36 He believes that the Court would uphold burden of proof
provisions in a new RFRA, creating presumptions that certain conduct is
unconstitutional and reallocating the risk of factual error in close cases. 137
However, Laycock has a tendency to exaggerate the scope of religious
prejudice in neutral laws. During the hearing, Laycock mentioned a
"discriminatory" zoning law in Chicago regulating the proximity of
churches to places where liquor was sold.' Senator Richard Durbin of
Illinois had to remind Professor Laycock that the churches themselves
banded together and asked for that law.'39 Laycock also attributes the
zoning situation inFloresto discrimination, even though there is absolutely
nothing in the record to indicate that historic preservation was only a proxy
to cover up discrimination against Catholics.4 ' A new RFRA including
legislative findings that these types of laws are presumed to be Smith
violations would certainly never pass the Court's analysis without strong
factual support. Although Laycock may cry prejudice here, a simple
congressional finding could not legitimately take these types of zoning
laws outside the scope of neutral, generally applicable laws deemed
acceptable by Smith despite the incidental burden on religious practice.
Compiling a record to support such a law under the enforcement power
would be an impossible task given the limits Flores put on the use of that
power over the states.
D. The Spending Power
The only congressional power that retains its full boundaries is the
spending power.' The limits of this power have most recently been
examined in South Dakota v. Dole,'42 a case decided in 1987 before the
Supreme Court began its current federalist trend. The power is used very
frequently by Congress to require the states to impose a regulation within
their boundaries in exchange for grants of federal funds. 3 The limits on
the spending power relevant in the RFRA context are that the condition on
'
36 See id. (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
.
37 See id. (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
'
38 See id. at 10 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
139 See id. at 44 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
'
4o See id. at 10 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
"41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
142 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
143 See id. at 206.
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the grant must be related to the program to be funded and that the condition
must be clearly stated.'"
The limits, even as they exist, may cause problems in the context of
religion. A single broad act granting money to the states in exchange for
anything approaching a literal reenactment of RFRA would be impossible.
While codifying the no-exemptions view is clearly the intent of Congress
and this condition could certainly be stated, there is no related program that
could justify such a bill. Congress, under the Establishment Clause, may
not spend money on religion,'45 and thus the Dole requirement that the
condition (religious freedom) be related to the spending could never
legitimately be satisfied if that requirement is to have any meaning at all.
Just as in the Commerce Clause context, the spending power might
legitimately be used to justify a number of smaller acts on a program-by-
program basis, but then again, the full effect of the original RFRA would
not be attained.
Another concern that Congress should address before using the
spending power to reenact a no-exemptions policy is the fact that the power
could very likely be restricted in light of the Court's federalist decisions of
the 1990s, from Lopez and New York v. United States up through Flores
and Printz in 1997.146 There has not been a major spending power case yet
this decade, and the virtual free reign over the states that Congress may
exercise with this power does not logically comport at all with the strict
state sovereignty limits the Court has imposed on Congress. Professor Lynn
Baker pointed out that "prevailing Spending Clause doctrine appears to
vitiate much of the import ofLopez"'47 and urged the Lopez majority to set
their sights on a reexamination of Dole.'48 Given the current composition
of the Court and recent decisions governing federal power to regulate the
states, Congress would be foolish to risk its spending power on another
attempt to void the Smith decision.
Professor Conkle also warned the Judiciary Committee thatDole could
be limited by testing this type of bill.'49 He especially noted that the Court
might tighten the concept of relatedness or limit the ways in which
'44See id. at 207.
'
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .....
146 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
14' Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1911, 1914 (1995).
148 See id.
149 See Hearing, supra note 5, at 38 (prepared statement of Prof. Daniel Conkle).
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Congress might enforce compliance. 5 ' He also expressed worries that
attempts by Congress to circumvent Flores might give the Court even
greater incentive to limit the power.'5' Like Congress's other potential
legislative solutions, the Spending Clause provides no certain answers in
the context of using federal law to provide religious exemptions to
compliance with neutral laws. Although the spending power is technically
still very broad, even it could probably not be used to reenact RFRA and
fulfill the Act's intent.
IV. A RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION AMENDMENT
A constitutional amendment incorporating the language and breadth of
RFRA is surely the best way for Congress to effectively fulfill the will of
the people on the topic of religious free exercise. As mentioned above, any
legislative action that is not significantly watered down is likely to be
struck down again by the Supreme Court in light of the Court's federalist
decisions of the 1990s.15 1 The amendment solution would certainly be a
bigger burden in the short run, but Congress could use this means to cure
the exemptions problem for the ages.
To provide some context for the discussion, this author proposes the
following Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment to display how
Congress could reenact the voided RFRA while maintaining an image of
respect for the power and role of the United States Supreme Court:
Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment
§ 1. The right of residents of the United States to exercise their
religion shall not be substantially burdened by either the United States or
any State, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in § 2 of this Article.
§ 2. The Government of the United States or a State may substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
§ 3. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to affect, interpret, or
in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws
respecting the establishment of religion. Granting government funding,
'
5 o See id. at 39 (prepared statement of Prof. Daniel Conkle).
... See id. (prepared statement of Prof. Daniel Conkle).
52ee discussion supra Part III and cases cited supra note 108.
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benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment
Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this Article.
§ 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
53
A Congressional bill providing protections of this extent and depth and
passed by a simple majority would be very unlikely to survive Supreme
Court review as argued above. 154 If Congress really cares about the issue of
religious free exercise unburdened by state regulation lacking compelling
justification, Congress must amend the Constitution.
Congress may currently be avoiding this course of action because the
amendment process as set out in the Constitution requires not only a two-
thirds congressional majority in both houses but also ratification from
three-fourths of the states5.' However, this difficult process is necessary
now because the Flores Court mandated that Congress shall not substan-
tively declare what an existing constitutional clause means. 56 For all the
5 An amendment drafting system, proposed by Professor Thomas Baker and
called the "republican veto," would have Congress draft an amendment simply
reading, "The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in [City ofBoerne
v. Flores], decided on June 25, 1997, is disapproved and set aside." Thomas Baker,
Exercising the Amendment Power to Disapprove of Supreme Court Decisions: A
Proposal for a "'Republican Veto," 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 325, 332 (1995).
The Baker proposal, while an interesting solution to the problem at hand, presents
some serious issues regarding the structural and linguistic integrity of the
Constitution. It is inconceivable that this language would generate the support of
a two-thirds majority of either house of Congress.
'
54 See discussion supra Part I.
155 The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call
a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
"' See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
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criticisms and editorials about inappropriate judicial activism in the wake
ofFlores,57 the amendment process does give Congress the ultimate trump
card when it comes to the substance of the Constitution. While the power
to interpret the broad words of the Constitution vests significant power in
the Court, congressionalpowerto amend the Constitution is unquestionably
greater.
Another factor which may be causing Senator Hatch and the Congress
to hesitate before proposing a Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment
is the frequency with which proposed constitutional amendments meet
quick deaths these days. Senator Hatch himself proposed a Religious
Equality Amendment in 1995 which failed to garner any significant
support. 158 In fact, since 1787, over 10,000 constitutional amendments have
been introduced in Congress, but only twenty-seven have been ratified.19
Congressional fears that an amendment proposal might be a waste of time
appear to be justified by history.
Many of the recent failed amendments are easily distinguishable from
a potential Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment. The provisions of
these other proposals go against what many people believe the plain words
of the current Constitution already says. 6 The latest proposed flag-burning
amendment16" ' would allow Congress and the states to outlaw what many
Americans consider to be a very important mode of political speech,162 thus
57 See Colson, supra note 97, at B5.
'
8 
"Neither the United States nor any State shall deny benefits to or otherwise
discriminate against any private person or group on account of religious expression,
belief, or identity; nor shall the prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of
religion be construed to require such discrimination." S.J. Res. 45, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 121, 104th Cong. (1995).
"' See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 111, 112 &n.6 (1993).
"6 This distinction comports with the premise of a recent proposal that the
Article V power to amend is not unlimited and that "an [Article VI] oath-bound
amender acts always within the terms of the constitutional text and should comport
herself as an interpreter, rather than an alterer of the Constitution." Note, The Faith
to Change: Reconciling the Oath to Uphold with the Power to Amend, 109 HARV.
L. REv. 1747, 1748 (1996).
161 "The Congress and the States shall have power to prohibit the physical
desecration of the flag of the United States." H.R.J. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995).
162 For example, newspaper editorials and opinion pieces have come down
almost unanimously against the passage of a flag desecration amendment. See
Editorial, Burn the Flag Amendment, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEwS, Nov. 1,
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directly overruling a significant portion of the current First Amendment
and substantially impairing the constitutional freedoms of individual
liberty. 63 The school prayer amendments"6 would replace the Court's
current interpretation of the Establishment Clause, a reading which is
extremely important to many civil libertarians, religious minorities, and
non-believing Americans.'65 The balanced budget amendment,'66 which is
less controversial because it does not limit the freedoms of American
citizens, is constitutionally unnecessary because Congress can balance the
budget under the existing Constitution and an amendment would involve
the courts in messy fiscal issues. 67
In contrast, a Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment would
simply add substance to the reading of the Free Exercise Clause which is
supported by virtually every religious group in America, as well as by the
1997, atA9; Editorial, Free Speech Is NotforBurning: This Country Doesn 'tNeed
a Ban on Flag Desecration, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at B6; Opinion, What the
Flag Really Means, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 21, 1997, at A36. But see Adrian
Cronauer, Flag's Unique Status Warrants Protection, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 4,
1997, at B7.
16 3 See generally Troy G. Pieper, Note, Playing with Fire: The Proposed Flag-
Burning Amendment and the Perennial Attack on Freedom of Speech, 11 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 843, 866 (1996) (arguing that the "utilization of
Article V's Amendment powers to limit a fundamental right, guaranteed by the
First Amendment, runs counter to the intent of the Framers and the spirit of the
Constitution").
'" For example, Representative Ernest Istook introduced the following amend-
ment in November 1995. It is still pending, after minor language changes.
To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates
of conscience: Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit acknowledgments
of the religious heritage, beliefs, or traditions of the people, or prohibit
student-sponsored prayer in public schools. Neither the United States nor
any State shall compose any official prayer or compel joining in prayer, or
discriminate against religious expression or belief.
H.R.J. Res. 127, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacting clause omitted).
l6 1 See generallyH. Fields Grenee, Editorial,Amendment WouldLimitReligious
Freedom, BUFFALO NEws, May 25, 1997, at H3.
166 See S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995).
167 See Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Be-
come Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 154 (1996)
("The balanced budget amendments considered by Congress would have a dramatic
impact on the balance of power between the three branches of government and
could increase the role of the judiciary in the budget process.").
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American Civil Liberties Union.'68 History fails to provide any conclusive
definition of the term "free exercise."'6 9 The issue cannot be settled by
looking at any known documentation, and in the wake of Flores, the power
of Congress to introduce legislation which would give real, substantive
meaning to the term is virtually gone. In effect, the above Religious
Freedom Restoration Amendment would clarify rather than change the
existing terms of the Constitution.
The amendment would also be consonant with the constitutional
tradition of protecting minorities from stark majority rule. Individuals who
happen to be religious minorities in their community would receive
bolstered protection from government interference with the expression of
their beliefs. In situations like that involved in Flores, even nonpersecuted
religious groups could practice without fear of government meddling and
supervision.
Finally, a Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment may have a
significant chance of being ratified. Although all of the recent, controver-
sial amendment proposals have failed, several have come extremely close
to passing through Congress. A 1995 flag-burning amendment passed the
House and fell three votes short in the Senate. 7 The balanced budget
amendment has fallen one vote short in the Senate twice in the last three
years. 7 ' The Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment will not have any
controversial aspect of limiting freedoms, andunlike a balanced budget, the
pro-exemptions reading of the Free Exercise Clause is not an objective
Congress will be able to fully achieve in the absence of an amendment.
Finally, the potential for grass roots mobilization in support of this
amendment could be enormous. On the national level, the organizations
that spoke up for RFRA and against Flores, from the Southern Baptist
Convention to the American Civil Liberties Union, could unite a vast
constituency that covers virtually the entire breadth of American society.
At a local level, churches could mobilize their congregations to put
,68 See Steinfels, supra note 15, at A18.
'
6 9 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1511 (1990) (arguing in favor
of a historically-based, pre-exemptions reading of the Free Exercise Clause, but
conceding that history fails to conclusively settle the issue of intent).
'
70 See Helen Dewar, Senate Falls Short on FlagAmendment, Desecration Ban
Was Measure's Aim, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1995, at Al.
I See Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, BudgetAmendmentBarely Loses in Senate!
SmallerDeficits, Social Security Fears Aid Foes, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at Al.
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pressure on their representatives to support the amendment. The free
practice of religion is a fundamental right that many Americans feel is
essential to their freedom as individuals, and it affects nearly everyone on
a far more personal level than the right to bum a flag or a balanced federal
budget might. A well-organized campaign could conceivably result in this
amendment, which would protect that right against government intrusion
in the form of neutral laws.
CONCLUSION
James Madison, unquestionably one of the Constitution's most
influential Framers, believed that duty to God is "precedent both in order
of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."'" A
national policy regarding unwarranted government interference inreligious
affairs, particularly at the state and local level where less heterogeneous
communities are likely to be hostile to minority religions, is in complete
accordance with the purpose and traditions of the United States.Iu
Congress clearly thought such a policy was necessary when it passed
RFRA by a virtually unanimous vote in 1993. The hearing in the Senate
Judiciary Committee is evidence that Congress still cares about the issue
and intends to use its powers to prevent government interference with
religious practice. The legislative proposals that were made in front of the
Committee will not produce the protections that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was intended to provide. If the issue of unburdened
religious practice is truly important, a results-oriented Congress must
buckle down and secure the full protections of RFRA by amending the
Constitution to include exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws.
172 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184-85 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1901).
173 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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